Abstract-A multiplicative Gaussian wire-tap channel inspired by compressed sensing is studied. Lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity are derived, and shown to be relatively tight in the large system limit for a large class of compressed sensing matrices. Surprisingly, it is shown that the secrecy capacity of this channel is nearly equal to the capacity without any secrecy constraint provided that the channel of the eavesdropper is strictly worse than the channel of the intended receiver. In other words, the eavesdropper can see almost everything and yet learn almost nothing. This behavior, which contrasts sharply with that of many commonly studied wiretap channels, is made possible by the fact that a small number of linear projections can make a crucial difference in the ability to estimate sparse vectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following Shannon's theory in 1949 of informationtheoretic secrecy [1] , Wyner introduced the wiretap channel in 1975 [2] . In the wiretap setting, a sender Alice wishes to communicate a message to a receiver Bob over a main channel but her transmissions are intercepted by an eavesdropper Eve through a secondary wiretap channel. The present paper analyzes a multiplicative Gaussian wiretap channel inspired by compressed sensing. The input to the channel is a p-length binary vector. The channel output is a linear transform of the input after it has first been corrupted by multiplicative white Gaussian noise. We analyze the setting where Bob and Eve observe different linear transforms characterized by two different channel matrices.
Secrecy via compressed sensing schemes has received little attention from an information-theoretic viewpoint. In prior work, authors consider using a sensing matrix as a key (unknown to the eavesdropper) for both encryption and compression [3] . Privacy via compressed sensing and linear programming decoding was explored in [4] . By contrast, this paper assumes that the sensing matrices are known (non-secret); as a special case, Eve's sensing matrix might correspond to a subset of the rows of Bob's channel matrix. Our analysis shows that certain channel matrices, inspired by compressed sensing, allow for secrecy rates that are nearly equal to the main channel capacity even if Eve's capacity is large.
A. Channel Model
Outlined in Fig. 1 , the multiplicative Gaussian wiretap channel with binary vector input is characterized by where X ∈ {0, 1} p is the transmitted signal, and Y ∈ R m b , Z ∈ R me are the received real-valued signals at the legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively. A related channel model in [5] also involves a wire-tap setting with binary input and real-valued output. The dimensions of the channel satisfy 0 ≤ m e < m b < p/2. The linear mixing parameters, matrices A b ∈ R m b ×p and A e ∈ R me×p , are fixed and known to all parties. The randomness of the channel is derived from W ∈ R p×p , a diagonal matrix whose values are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variance one. The channel is assumed to be memoryless between channel uses.
B. Secrecy Capacity
Alice selects a message S n ∈ [1 : 2 npR ], where R represents a normalized rate, and wishes to communicate reliably with Bob while keeping the message secret from Eve. A (2 npR , n) secrecy code for the multiplicative wiretap channel consists of the following: (1) A message set [1 : 2 npR ]; (2) A randomized encoder that generates a codeword X n (S n ), S n ∈ [1 : 2 npR ], according to P X n |Sn ; (3) A decoder that assigns a messagê
The message S n is a random variable with entropy satisfying
A secrecy code is reliable if
A secrecy code is secret if the information leakage rate tends to zero as block length n → ∞,
A normalized rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 npR , n) secrecy codes satisfying both Eqn. (4) and Eqn. (5) . The secrecy capacity C s is the supremum over all achievable rates.
C. Outline
To analyze the secrecy capacity C s , we first develop bounds as a function of the channel matrices A b and A e . We then analyze these bounds for certain random matrices in the large system limit where m b /p → ρ b and m e /p → ρ e as p → ∞ for fixed constants 0 ≤ ρ e ≤ ρ b ≤ 1/2. Lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, corresponding to Wyner's coding strategy for discrete memoryless channels are developed in Section II-A. Corresponding upper bounds are derived in Section II-B. Section II-C provides an improved upper bound under a certain encoding constraint on Alice. Proofs of some the key results are provided in Section III; the remaining proofs can be found in the online version of this paper [6] .
D. Notations
For a matrix A ∈ R m×p and vector x ∈ {0, 1} p , we use A(x) to denote the matrix formed by concatenating the columns indexed by x, and we use A(i) to denote the ith column of A. Also, we use X p k to denote the set of all binary vectors x ∈ {0, 1} p with exactly k ones. We use
to denote binary the binary entropy function. We use log to denote the logarithm with base two and ln to denote the logarithm with the natural base.
II. MAIN RESULTS
Csiszar and Korner showed in [7] that the secrecy capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel is given by
where the auxiliary random variable U satisfies the Markov chain relationship: U → X → (Y, Z). It can be verified that this is also the secrecy capacity when the channels have discrete inputs and continuous outputs (see e.g. [5] ). In some special cases, the secrecy capacity can be computed easily from (6) . For example, if A b and A e correspond to the first m b and m e rows of the p × p identity matrix respectively, then it is straightforward to show that
In this case, the secrecy capacity happens to be the difference of the individual channel capacities; thus as m e approaches m b the secrecy capacity tends to zero. In the following sections we will develop bounds for a class of matrices inspired by compressed sensing. Interestingly, we will see that the secrecy behavior of these matrices differs greatly from the behavior shown in (7).
A. Lower Bounds
We say that a matrix A ∈ R m×p is fully linearly independent (FLI) if the span of each submatrix {A(x) ∈ R m×m−1 : x ∈ X p m−1 } defines a unique linear subspace of R m . Examples of FLI matrices include the first m rows of the p × p discrete cosine transform matrix or, with probability one, any matrix whose entries are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution. A counter example is given by the first m rows of the p × p identity matrix.
Our first result, which is proved in Section III-A, gives a general lower bound on the secrecy capacity for any FLI matrices. 
Theorem 1. Suppose that
The lower bound in Theorem 1 is derived by evaluating the right hand side of (6) when X is distributed uniformly over the set X p m b −1 . We note that the condition m e < m b is necessary to obtain a nontrivial lower bound since the secrecy capacity may be equal to zero otherwise.
Unfortunately, the bound in Theorem 1 is difficult to compute if m b and p are large. One way to address this issue is to analyze the behavior for a random matrix (random matrices are denoted via boldface, uppercase letters). The following result is proved in Section III-B. 
Theorem 2. Suppose that A b is fully linearly independent and
where
One benefit of Theorem 2 is that the bound is independent of the realization of the matrix A e and can be analyzed directly. An illustration of the bound is shown in Figure 2 as a function of m e /p for various values of p with m b /p held fixed. Remarkably, as p becomes large, the lower bound in Theorem 2 remains bounded away from zero for all values of m e strictly less than m b . This behavior is in stark contrast to the secrecy capacity shown in (7) .
One shortcoming of Theorem 2, is that the bound holds only in expectation, and it is possible that it is violated for a constant fraction of matrices A e . The next result, which is proved in Section III-C, shows that, in the asymptotic setting, the limit of the bound (9) holds for almost every realization of A e . We use the notation {A p → ∞ where 0 ≤ ρ e ≤ ρ b ≤ 1/2, then the asymptotic secrecy capacity is lower bounded by
Theorem 3 provides a concise characterization of the lower bound in the asymptotic setting. The bound is illustrated in Figure 2 in the case p = ∞. Since the secrecy capacity can be equal to zero if m 
B. Upper Bounds via Channel Capacity
This section considers the capacity of Bob's channel which is denoted C b . We note that this capacity gives us an upper bound on the secrecy capacity.
Upper bounding the capacity is more technically challenging than lower bounding the secrecy capacity, since the optimal distribution on X may depend nontrivially on channel matrix A b . The following result, which is proved in Section III-D, serves as a starting point.
Theorem 4. If A b is fully linearly independent, then the channel capacity of Bob's channel is upper bounded by
Although it is tempting to consider the expectation of (11) with respect to a random matrix (as we did for Theorem 2), this is difficult since the maximization in (12) occurs inside the expectation.
Our next result, which is proved in Section III-E of the online version of this paper [6] , leverages the strong concentration properties of the Gaussian distribution to characterize the asymptotic capacity for Gaussian matrices. 
almost surely.
Theorem 5 shows that the strategy used in our lower bounds, namely choosing X uniformly over X p m b −1 achieves the capacity of Bob's channel in the asymptotic setting. What is remarkable is that for this same input distribution, Eve learns very little about what is being sent, even if her channel matrix is equal to the first m e rows of Bob's channel matrix.
C. Improved Upper Bound for a Restricted Setting
We say that the distribution is symmetric if
The following result is proved in Section III-F of the online version of this paper [6] . 
almost surely where X ∼ Bernoulli(ρ b ), W ∼ N (0, 1) and V ∼ N (0, 1) are independent random variables.
The bound in Theorem 6 is strictly less than the channel capacity H 2 (ρ b ) for all ρ e > 0, and can be computed easily using numerical integration. We suspect that this result also holds without the symmetry restriction on X.
D. Illustration of Bounds
The bounds on the asymptotic secrecy capacity given in Theorems 3, 5, are 6 and illustrated in Fig. 3 as a function of the size parameter ρ e of the eavesdropper channel. The bounds correspond to the setting where the elements of the matrices are i.i.d. Gaussian. Note that the lower bound on the secrecy capacity is nearly equal to that of the main channel for all ρ e < ρ b .
For comparison, the secrecy capacity for the special case where A b and A e correspond to the first rows of the p × p identity matrix are shown in Fig. 4 . In this case, the secrecy capacity is equal to the difference of the main channel capacity and eavesdropper capacity. 
III. PROOFS

A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let U = X where X is distributed uniformly over X 
Next, since A e is fully linearly independent and the number of nonzero values in X is strictly greater than the rank of A e , it can be verified that both Z and Z|X have probability densities. (Note that the condition m b > m e is critical here, since Z does not have a density otherwise.) Thus we can write
where h(·) denotes differential entropy (see e.g. [8] ). The entropy h(Z) can be upper bounded as
where (17) follows from the fact that the Gaussian distribution maximizes differential entropy and (18) follows from the fact that
The conditional entropy h(Z|X) is given by
where we used the fact that, conditioned on any realization X = x, Z is a (non-degenerate) Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix A e (x)A e (x) T . Combining (15), (16), (18), and (20) with the expression of the secrecy capacity given in (6) completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward to show that A e is fully linearly independent with probability one. Since the secrecy rate is bounded, it thus follows from Theorem 1 and the linearity of expectation that where the second equality holds for every x ∈ X p m b −1 . Plugging these expressions into (21) completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Since A e is fully linearly independent with probability one, it is sufficient to consider the asymptotic behavior of the bound in Theorem 1. If X is a random vector distributed uniformly over X 
